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Abstract The field of metaethics, the branch of moral philosophy that examines the
nature and status of morality, is rich in theoretical diversity. Nonetheless, a majority
of professional philosophers embrace a subset of theories that affirm the existence of
objective moral facts. I suggest that this may be related to the very method that
philosophers use to construct metaethical theories. This method involves analyzing
how ordinary people think and argue about morality. Analysis of ordinary moral
discourse is meant to reveal common platitudes (or truisms) about the nature of
morality itself, including the platitude that morality trades in objective moral facts.
But do philosophers investigate ordinary moral discourse in any systematic way?
How do they arrive at such platitudes? On what grounds are they justified? In this
paper, I critically examine these questions and argue that a) any such platitudes need
to be investigated systematically through empirical research and b) philosophers
ought to be engaged in this research themselves.
Keywords Metaethics  Experimental philosophy  Folk morality  Folk
metaethics  Moral objectivism  Moral platitudes
The field of metaethics, the branch of moral philosophy that examines the nature
and status of morality, is rich in theoretical diversity (e.g., Miller 2003). There are
philosophers who maintain that morality is fictional, relative, constructed,
expressive, subjective, quasi-real, real, just one big error, and many other variations
besides. And yet, the majority of professional philosophers adhere to one theoretical
position—namely, some form of moral realism. To cite a relevant data point: a 2009
survey conducted by PhilPapers of over 3000 professional philosophers and
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graduate students found that more than half (56%) embraced moral realism (Bourget
and Chalmers 2014). Why?
This is a question I cannot fully answer in this paper. However, one reason for
realism’s popularity stems from the very method that philosophers use to construct
metaethical theories. This method involves analyzing how ordinary people conceive
of or argue about morality. Analysis of such ordinary usage is meant to reveal
common platitudes (or truisms) about the nature of morality itself. One central
platitude embraced by philosophers maintains that ordinary moral discourse is
objectivist in its character, that people tend to believe there are moral facts, and that
moral disagreement is concerned with such objective moral facts. The precise
characterization of this platitude varies across accounts, but the basic idea is often
explained in terms of how ordinary people react to cases of moral disagreement: if
ordinary people are not committed to the existence of such real facts about morality,
the argument goes, it is difficult to understand why they engage in moral debate at
all, and why they proffer arguments and attempt to reason through moral issues.
But how do philosophers arrive at this platitude about ordinary folk morality? On
what grounds do they justify claims about ordinary moral discourse and practice?
Are the emerging platitudes the proper explananda for a metaethical theory? In what
follows, I will discuss this method used in analytic metaethics, and scrutinize the
claim that folk moral objectivism emerges as a platitude requiring explanation. A
key feature of this method is to collect a number of purported commonplace notions
about morality, along with some uses of moral language, so as to uncover
conceptual truths that any metaethical theory must accommodate. However, as I’ll
argue, while this method claims to examine ordinary usage, it fails to do so, thus
risking enshrining philosophers’ beliefs about morality as ordinary beliefs. I’ll then
turn to attempts by experimental philosophers to redress this issue by undertaking
the piecemeal and messy work of investigating, in systematic ways, the nature of
folk morality. The emerging picture is that ordinary folk morality is far less uniform
(and far more interesting) than philosophers have traditionally maintained. By
expanding the explananda of philosophical metaethics, experimental philosophers
are poised to contribute to it in fundamental ways.
What are Platitudes?
A widespread commitment in analytic metaethics involves studying platitudes (or
commonplace beliefs) about morality. These platitudes can consist of explicit, well-
worn truisms (e.g., ‘‘if an action is morally wrong, one ought not do it’’) or implicit
commitments that emerge from an analysis of the ways in which ordinary people are
disposed to judge, act upon, and evaluate moral concepts. The assumption is that
ordinary folk have competence with moral concepts (a kind of ‘‘know-how’’), so
understanding morality requires examining ordinary folk usage. According to an
influential account by Michael Smith,
in acquiring a concept C we come to acquire a whole set of inferential and
judgemental dispositions connecting facts expressed in terms of the concept C
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with facts of other kinds. A statement of all of these various dispositions
constitutes a set of platitudes surrounding C. And an analysis of a concept is
then best thought of as an attempt to articulate all and only these platitudes.
(Smith 1994, pp. 37–38)
Platitudes about morality, then, are commonplace truths that emerge from an
analysis of the numerous facts surrounding the ordinary uses of moral concepts.
Smith goes on to claim that there are two platitudes about morality that
metaethicists must, above all others, accommodate in their theories. These
platitudes ‘‘are manifest in ordinary moral practice as it is engaged in by ordinary
folk,’’ and the ‘‘philosopher’s task,’’ we are told, ‘‘is to make sense of a practice
having these features’’ (Smith 1994, p. 5). One platitude maintains that when
persons make moral judgments they are motivated to act on them.1 The other, and
the one I’ll focus on, maintains that persons engaging in moral discourse assume
that moral facts exist—that there are objectively correct answers to moral questions.
How does Smith arrive at these particular platitudes? In spite of the central role
they play in his theoretical account, there is little to directly answer this question.
This is not to say that Smith fails to provide well-argued considerations in favor of
these platitudes. However, their ‘‘ordinariness’’ is largely established in passing and
through stipulation. For example, we are simply told that
it is a distinctive feature of engaging in moral practice that the participants are
concerned to get the answers to moral questions right. And this concern itself
seems to force certain meta-ethical conclusions… [We] seem to think moral
questions have correct answers; that the correct answers are made correct by
objective moral facts; that moral facts are wholly determined by circum-
stances; and that, by engaging in moral conversation and argument, we can
discover what these objective moral facts determined by the circumstances
are. (see, e.g., Smith 1994, pp. 5–6)
The use of the pronoun ‘‘we’’ is meant to signify that these notions are ordinary,
in the sense of being widespread and representative of how most users of moral
concepts think (or would think, if only they engaged in such thoughts). However,
apart from this, there is little else speaking to the actual process of settling on the
veracity of the platitudes themselves.
Smith is by no means alone in thinking of metaethics as the study of platitudes
that emerge from an examination of ordinary moral practice. It is, in fact, a default
method in the field. Consider, for example, how Terence Cuneo discusses the
explananda of metaethics.
When we talk of a commonsensical conception of a putative moral feature, we
mean to pick out a way of thinking about that feature that incorporates various
platitudes concerning the content and objectivity of that feature that are
sufficiently entrenched in the beliefs and practices of ordinary folk that moral
realists and antirealists ordinarily attempt to accommodate them in their
respective theories. (Cuneo 2007, pp. 36–39)
1 For critical discussion of this platitude, see Gill (2009).
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Here, what is commonsensical is characterized as incorporating platitudes
entrenched among ordinary folk usage. And, as evidence of their ordinariness,
Cuneo appeals to the fact that various professional philosophers agree that they are
ordinary (and Cuneo is certainly correct about that).
Cuneo also has two platitudes that play a central role in his account. These
concern the content and the authority of morality (Cuneo 2007, pp. 36–39).
Regarding the content, he claims that (a) only actions that promote or frustrate
human flourishing merit the terms ‘‘moral’’ and ‘‘immoral’’ (respectively), and
(b) there are limits to what counts as authentic human flourishing. Regarding the
authority, he claims that (a) moral facts provide reasons for action, and (b) they are
authoritative, inescapably governing a person’s conduct. Once again, readers are
provided with no further data to support the claim to ordinariness; instead, it seems
taken for granted that readers (invariably, other professional philosophers) will find
them unobjectionable. And they routinely do.
Examples like these abound in the literature (e.g., Darwall 1998, p. 25; Jackson
2000, p. 137; Joyce 2011, p. 529). And some of the platitudes may turn out to be
true. But, as I’ll argue, whether or not they are true cannot be established from
philosophers’ armchairs.
The Trouble with Platitudes
How do philosophers verify or establish that they’ve articulated the correct
platitudes? How do they come to know these ordinary truths? As argued above,
there is little here beyond stipulations that philosophers themselves find compelling.
As Michael Gill notes, systematic, empirical investigation of ordinary folk usage by
philosophers is, historically, exceedingly rare. Philosophers have ‘‘typically
presented some examples of ordinary discourse. But they didn’t gather data in
any kind of comprehensive and systematic way. A handful of illustrative cases were
taken to be a sufficient starting point’’ (2009, p. 217). Of course, it can be
maintained that philosophers are ordinary folk too, differing from others only in the
rigor and systematicity with which they approach the moral domain (Smith 1994,
p. 1). But just how ordinary are philosophers? And how can readers evaluate claims
to ordinariness?
Cuneo is admirably forthright about this issue. He acknowledges that talk of
what’s ordinary or commonsensical ‘‘is bound to arouse suspicion’’ (Cuneo 2007,
p. 32).
What, after all, could we mean by the claim that there is an ordinary or
commonsensical conception of a kind? And what could be meant by the claim
that there is an ordinary or commonsensical conception of specifically moral
features?… (Cuneo 2007, p. 32).
Suppose some philosophers reject the platitudes that others find compelling?
Suppose some characterize ordinary discourse in ways that diverge from their
peers? What to do?
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Philosophers rarely tackle this question head on, as there seems to be no good
way, given the methods they embrace, of resolving such cases of disagreement. As
Richard Joyce writes, philosophers ‘‘have no settled views on how to adjudicate or
even conceptualize such a debate. If one person asserts that something is a non-
negotiable feature of some concept and another person denies this, where should
they take their dispute?’’ (Joyce 2006, p. 142). We are left with little more than
assertion and counter-assertion, supported by overall considerations that seem
compelling to some but not to others.2
Gill is, once again, instructive. He notes that proponents on opposite sides of such
debates have tried to show that their views make better sense of folk usage as a
whole, even while admitting to the existence of troubling counterexamples. Any
such counterexamples can, after all, be explained away in some form or other.
Besides, they can uncover troubling counterexamples for their opponents. But their
opponents will then simply explain these counterexamples away in turn. The
dialectic has been such that ‘‘each side contended that while their position had some
awkward elements, the opposing position had even more awkward elements, and
that this was a powerful reason for thinking that their own position was true’’ (2009,
pp. 217–218).
For his own part, Cuneo’s responds to imagined skeptics who question the
veracity (or ordinariness) of his proffered platitudes by claiming that the platitudes
themselves need not be widespread after all in order to serve as the proper
explananda of a metaethical theory. They need only be representative of a plausible
subpopulation of persons.
But suppose that I am wrong about [these platitudes]. Then what I say can be
easily recast as saying that our ‘commonsensical’ conception of moral features
is constituted by a certain stock of platitudes that are sufficiently entrenched in
the beliefs and practices of some subset of the ordinary folk, and that
philosophers have typically found these platitudes plausible enough to want to
try to preserve them in their moral theories. (Cuneo 2007, pp. 32–33, emphasis
added)
Of course, this retreat to a subset of the ordinary folk only raises further
questions. What justifies relying on this subpopulation? How is it picked out, and
why should it be considered representative? Is talk of what’s commonsensical or
ordinary just a way for philosophers to claim broader legitimacy for their
idiosyncratic notions? After all, it seems as though the relevant criterion for
evaluating talk of what is ordinary is agreement by some other professional
2 A parallel worry is raised in the Zhuangzi, a compendium of early Daoist thought, concerning the
adjudication of competing claims among philosophers about the substance of morality. ‘‘Once you and I
have started arguing… Is one of us right and the other one wrong? Or are both of us right and both of us
wrong?…Whom shall we get to set us right? Shall we get someone who agrees with you to set us right?
But if they already agree with you how can they set us right? Shall we get someone who agrees with me to
set us right? But if they already agree with me, how can they set us right? Shall we get someone who
disagrees with both of us to set us right? But if they already disagree with both of us, how can they set us
right? Shall we get someone who agrees with both of us to set us right? But if they already agree with
both of us, how can they set us right? If you and I and they all can’t understand each other, should we wait
for someone else?’’ (Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2005, p. 223).
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philosophers.3 If it turns out that philosophers have uncovered the wrong
platitudes, the right thing to do (we are told) is not to revise them but instead to
ignore ordinary usage and press ahead with the platitudes that are of interest to
philosophers; after all, they are representative of some group or other, and at any
rate philosophers (ordinary folk!) find them plausible enough.
In recent years, though, there’s been a growing recognition that claims about folk
morality ought to be addressed not from one’s armchair but rather through
systematic empirical investigation. Gill, as might be expected, calls for such
empirical research (2009, p. 232). But so do others. Richard Joyce, for example,
agrees that there is a pressing need for such research, as the resulting data would
ultimately trump anything that philosophers might aver from the armchair. Thus,
what needs to be examined in detail are the conventions surrounding moral
discourse in our natural language. Quiet and careful introspection is not a
reliable source of knowledge on such matters; we really need to observe
language being used across a wide range of everyday settings. (Joyce 2006,
p. 138)
There are many ways to approach the question, and I don’t want to deny that
sitting in one’s armchair and speculating may be among them (such activity
often casts up promising ideas)—but the ultimate arbiter must be the body of a
posteriori data issuing from such disciplines as psychology, anthropology, and
experimental economics. (Ibid, pp. 143–144, emphasis added)
Research on folk morality by social and behavioral scientists is indeed of great
value when pursuing questions about the nature and status of morality. But it is also
true that metaethicists have interests, commitments, and hypotheses that may not be
obvious targets of empirical investigation by researchers in these other disciplines.
So philosophers ought to be involved in generating the hypotheses and collecting
and analyzing the data.
Experimental Metaethics
Consider, again, the central claim (noted above) that ordinary moral discourse and
practice seems committed to objectivism of some sort. On first pass, this seems like
a plausible claim. For example, in ordinary discourse, assertions about rightness or
wrongness are not normally qualified in any way. People do not ordinarily say that
‘‘racial discrimination is wrong insofar as one values human dignity or equality.’’
Instead, the language is baldly absolutist: ‘‘racial discrimination is wrong!’’ People
also engage in protracted debates about moral issues and seem interested in arguing
for the correctness of their views. What does this tell us about the nature of folk
morality? The dominant interpretation is that these aspects of folk morality (and
related ones) reveal a folk commitment to the existence of objective moral facts.
3 Compare Doris and Stich (2005, pp. 124–125) on claims about conceptual truths concerning
motivational internalism.
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Only such a commitment, the argument goes, can explain these and related features
of ordinary discourse. Is this interpretation correct?
Some experimental forays by philosophers and psychologists alike have begun to
explore whether or not this is the case, and many have followed procedures and
suggestions found in the philosophical literature outlined above.4 Consider, for
example, the following passage from Smith.
… it is a platitude that our moral judgements at least purport to be objective….
Thus if A says ‘It is right to u in circumstances C’ and B says ‘It is not right to
u in circumstances C’ then we take it that A and B disagree; that at most one
of their judgements is true… (Smith 1994, 86)
One way to test this platitude is to investigate how ordinary folk react to just such
cases of disagreement. Do they agree that at most one of the two judgments can be
true? Or do they disagree, and find the conflicting judgments equally acceptable?
This basic paradigm is readily amenable to empirical investigation, and has been
used in several different permutations across a number of studies. The results
suggest a complicated picture that should militate against any attempt to depict folk
morality as having some definite, invariant, objectivist shape. For even while some
early studies by Nichols (2004) and Goodwin and Darley (2008), for example,
showed that a majority of individuals tend to think moral disagreements admit of
only a single correct answer, these studies routinely found sizable minorities of
participants (approximately 30–40%) who disagree, and think the disagreeing
judgments could both be correct. Goodin and Darley also uncovered wide disparities
in people’s tendencies to embrace objectivism across specific moral issues. When
participants were presented with cases of disagreement on the permissibility of
discrimination based on race, cheating on a lifeguard qualification exam, opening
gunfire on a crowded street, or robbing a bank to pay for an expensive holiday,
majorities (54–68%) said one of the disagreeing parties had to be wrong. Yet when
it came to other topics such as the use of stem cells in research, the permissibility of
abortion during the first trimester, or the permissibility of euthanasia for the
terminally ill, very few seemed to think so (only 8–10%).
Some researchers found these results baffling. One attempt to understand these
large differences within the moral domain focused on experimental design (Wright
et al. 2013). The studies above adopt a third-person approach to design, where the
experimenters themselves decide what constitutes moral disagreements (as opposed
to, say, factual or aesthetic disagreements) and present these disagreements to
participants to adjudicate. But, of course, some participants might not agree with the
experimenters’ classifications. Take, for example, donating to charity. Some might
think this a paradigmatically moral act, whereas others might think it a matter of
personal choice, or even a self-interested act (if motivated by considerations of self-
esteem or tax breaks). If that’s so, these individuals might judge that there is no
objectively correct answer about whether it’s right to donate to charity because they
don’t take this to be a moral act at all.
4 For a more detailed overview of the existing literature, see Sarkissian (2016).
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To overcome this potential limitation, Jennifer Wright et al. (2013) used a first-
person approach and asked participants to classify the topics of disagreement
themselves.5 They were given four choices for classification: factual, moral,
conventional, or taste. Their hypothesis was that participants would show much
higher and more consistent levels of objectivism for the items they themselves
deemed to be moral. This prediction failed. The researchers found no difference
between average levels of objectivism for the moral items as compared to the
conventional items, with considerably variability within the moral domain. The
evidence, they argue, supports pluralism about the moral domain among ordinary
folk; for some topics they deem moral, they believe there are objectively correct
answers. For others, they demur.
What explains these differences in objectivity judgments within the moral
domain? Some have found evidence that folk use their judgments about consensus
on the particular moral issue as a basis for their judgments about their objectivity
(Ayars and Nichols in prep; Beebe 2014; Goodwin and Darley 2012; Nichols
forthcoming), and this might explain the differences in objectivity scores noted
above; after all, topics such as stem cell research, abortion, and euthanasia are
paradigmatic cases of moral controversies (so much so that they are mainstays of
applied ethics courses). And studies on children show that this tendency to treat
consensus as a proxy for objectivity emerges early on in development, persisting
through adulthood (Heiphetz and Young 2016). Of course, if such an account is
correct, philosophers would be mistaken to infer that a commitment to objectivism
underlies ordinary moral practice. Other studies point to individual differences to
explain why individuals diverge in their judgments about moral objectivity,
including aspects of their personality (Feltz and Cokely 2008; Goodwin and Darley
2010), or age (Beebe and Sackris 2016).
Of course, as noted in the previous section, not all philosophers think the
objectivity platitude is central to ordinary discourse. Consider, for example, David
Wong’s (2006) characterization of ‘‘moral ambivalence,’’ a feeling that arises when
one disagrees with someone on a moral issue, even though one finds this person to
be knowledgeable, reasonable, and morally competent. In such cases, when we fail
to persuade others whom we find neither obstinate nor uninformed, when we gain
new insight into an issue about which we previously felt certainty, Wong claims that
it is normal to step back and question the superiority or unique correctness of one’s
own judgment.
Understanding other moral codes and the ways of life in which they are
embedded is not to see them as alien and incomprehensible but in some
respects familiar and in other respects constituting a challenge to our own
codes and ways of life. Since we ourselves are complex and ambivalent moral
beings, we are able to see that at least some other codes and ways of life may
just as reasonably be adopted by decent and informed human beings as our
own. (Wong 2006, 20)
5 The ‘third-person’ approach is dominant within experimental psychology, though there are strengths
and weaknesses to both approaches. See Meindl and Graham (2014) for helpful discussion.
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If this characterization of ordinary practice has merit, then we ought to be able to
see it revealed in experimental settings.
Indeed, there are now a number of studies that support this phenomenon of moral
ambivalence. Sarkissian et al. (2011), for example, note that most cases of
disagreement portrayed in the experimental studies discussed above depict the two
disagreeing parties as either explicitly or implicitly peers from the same (and
sometimes very local) cultural group, and argue that it would be natural for folk to
think there could be correct answers to moral disagreements relative to such specific
contexts. However, folk might react differently to cases of disagreement between
individuals of differing cultural backgrounds and value orientations, revealing an
ambivalence not unlike the kind described by Wong above. In their studies, they
used standard cases of disagreement between two people described as peers, but also
included cases in which the disagreement was between someone described as a peer
and a person of a foreign culture with different value orientations—either a member
of an isolated tribe in the Amazonian rainforest or an extraterrestrial being with a
different psychological profile. While in the first type of case a majority of
participants thought there could only be a single correct answer, they tended to drop
this attitude as the disagreeing individuals were described as dissimilar and foreign.
If folk were indeed objectivists in the face of disagreement, it would not matter what
values or cultural perspective individuals brought to bear on the topic of discussion;
there would still be only one correct answer. Thus, Sarkissian et al. conclude that
ordinary folk might tacitly believe moral judgments are qualified in certain ways—
for example, being relative to a cultural framework. They found this basic effect
across a number of experimental variations, and the finding has been replicated in
other research, together with an account of the semantics of disagreement at play
(Khoo and Knobe 2016).
Indeed, this same basic phenomenon has been uncovered using a completely
different experimental paradigm. Fisher et al. (2016) changed the context of
disagreement by prompting participants to adopt particular mindsets before
engaging in debate themselves. Some participants were encouraged to take an
‘‘argue-to-win’’ mindset (promoting a goal of scoring points over opponents),
whereas others were encouraged to take an ‘‘argue-to-learn’’ mindset (promoting
discovery of new information). Across a series of experiments, they found
consistent evidence that when prompted to learn and discover new information,
participants were more likely to think that a moral issue admitted of more than one
correct answer. By contrast, those in the competitive condition did not differ from
those in a control condition (where no particular mindset was suggested) in
affirming a more objective viewpoint.
More work needs to be done to fine-tune this picture. But if these data are right,
they suggest that philosophers may take either combative instances of moral
discourse, or moral discourse within cultures, to be paradigmatic. If this is so, it is
troubling for at least two reasons. First, and most obviously, philosophers’ accounts
of ordinary usage would fail to capture how folk think about the nature of morality
when they are engaged in moral discussion with those they find reasonable,
knowledgeable, or competent, even while occupying very different value orienta-
tions. Yet many may find such forms of discussion to be the ideal form of moral
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dialogue. Second, and more generally, this research shows folk morality to be far
more complex and nuanced than philosophers’ accounts tend to portray it.
Conclusion
Metaethicists have been committed to working out the platitudes lying behind
ordinary moral discourse and practice, and have tended to assume that there is
something determinate and invariant there to study (Gill 2009), something readily
amenable to theorizing and capable of being summarized in a small number of
truisms. However, if anything like the picture just sketched is true, this basic method
stands to be revised. Experimental philosophers point to a way forward by carrying
out the kind of messy, systematic research about ordinary moral usage that seems
necessary to come to a more accurate and detailed account of the explananda of
metaethical theories.
Indeed, one effect of having canvassed the experimental literature may be to
come to a more vivid awareness of the insular way that analytic metaethics can
proceed. The standard method deployed by philosophers risks mistaking their own,
professionally sanctioned platitudes qua philosophers as those of ordinary folk,
when they might instead be peculiar or idiosyncratic. The worry is all the more
pressing when one considers that most philosophers in the Anglo-American world
are a self-selected group of white males who read and respond to one another’s work
on the topic, with comparatively little interest in what others in disciplines such as
anthropology or psychology might have to say about it, let alone what ordinary
users of moral language think.
This does not, of course, necessarily impugn philosophers’ beliefs about ordinary
platitudes; philosophers are products of the broader cultures in which they develop,
and it would be surprising if their notions were wildly off the mark. Nonetheless, we
might wonder what effects professionalization and clustering around a few core
claims might do for the nature of metaethical inquiry. At the very least, we should
examine whether much of ordinary moral life is simply left out of the picture, and
whether philosophers analyzing folk morality from the armchair might instead be
generating idiosyncratic platitudes that seem compelling to them but are of
questionable relevance to actual moral discourse and practice.
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